Power, Principle, and Insolvency

Croft 1

James Croft

4/29/08

American Foreign Policy

TR 1:30pm

Power, Principle, and Insolvency

American Foreign Policy is rooted in two distinct ideologies, realism and idealism. In the realist tradition of foreign policy there is no need or reason to justify the use of power morally. American’s however tend to require that moral justification before popular opinion gets behind the policies. American foreign policy cannot simply be defined as being one and not the other, however. Our political system is too dynamic to be dominated by one single ideology. Every time we elect new leaders, we put into power new policies and ways of thinking.

Foreign policy instead is defined by the struggle between realism and idealism, or power and principle. It is when there is a good balance between the two that American foreign policy works the best. It is when we lean to far in one direction that the policies become insolvent, or when our actions do not accurately reflect our aims and goals. Good foreign policies find that healthy balance between the extremes of realism and idealism, and power and principle.

Realism and Universalism

Realism takes a logical approach to foreign policy and leaves out morals and emotional attachments. Realism likes to way things out and assesses power and prioritizes goals. Universalism is idealism in foreign policy terms. Two define the conflict between the two and to achieve a good balance one must first understand the two.

Realism has the following assumptions: the nation-state is the unit of analysis, that anarchy is in the international system, that uncertainty surrounds the actions of other world leaders, that a nation must rely on its own resources for national security, and that the use of power should be amoral. This approach is rather pessimistic in comparison to universalism.

Realists place a heavy emphasis on the Balance of Power theory when approaching international politics. The balance of power theory says that there is a delicate balance between the world’s power that keeps the nations from declining into chaos and war. In the 1800s up to World War II, realists saw the balance of power as a multi-polar system between Great Britain, Russia, Prussia/Germany, France and Austria-Hungary. During the cold war and after World War II it changed to a bi-polar system between the US and the USSR, and now the balance has evolved into a unipolar system with the US as the sole world power and has brought new and never before encountered challenges to foreign policy. To preserve the balance of power no nation should seek absolute security from external threats, all participants must be flexible and must not make permanent alliances, and the nations involved should ignore the domestic politics of the nations they are dealing with. Furthermore in the Kissinger Formulation nations should be willing to negotiate rather than fight, if those negotiations fail to uphold the national interests then the nation must fight, those fights must be limited to small wars rather than large ones that may present system change, if any nation tries to dominate the system then the others must unite against that nation to prevent system dominance, the must also stop fighting in order to preserve the balance, and preserve the existing members of the balance.

The realist tradition is rather conservative in its outlook, a stark contrast to the idealistic approach of universalism. The roots of Universalism are attributed mostly to President Woodrow Wilson, who often used principle in his foreign policy decisions. Universalism is characterized by collective security, international institutions, and the propagation of democracy. Wilson displayed these attributes prominently. Universalism is heavily rooted in the notion of American Exceptionalism. In American Exceptionalism the US is seen as a unique nation because of it’s institutions which were democratic at a time when the dominant powers were monarchic, it’s equality in their social structure, it’s free-tradist and anti-mercantilist economy, and it’s divine providence as a “nation upon a hill.” The former tended to make America a crusader state, and dangerous in the view of others.

Both traditions and approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, but neither is the answer in and of it’s self. If one leans to far in one direction, one becomes more and more likely for it’s policies to become insolvent.

Successful Policies in the 20^th Century

Magstadt saw the most successful foreign policies as those that found the balance between principle and power, and when the aims meet the actions of the nation. There are several successful examples of good policies following these criteria in the twentieth century.

Containment policy following World War II was one such policy. Containment policy matched power and principle, and the actions fell in line with the aims and interests of the state. The Kennan version of containment sought to control the spread of soviet ideology, and the actions taken to do so were to build of the economies of the western European nations as quickly as possible. The economic assistance was backed with the Truman Doctrine. This balance between power (the Truman Doctrine) and principle (halting of soviet ideology) created a solvent and successful policy.

Things changed when Eisenhower came into power, and changed the name of the game to Deterrence. During Eisenhower’s time in office, the soviets became more of a military threat and a threat that needed to be met with force. Deterrence sought to keep the soviets from expanding beyond their borders with the use of the US’s nuclear arsenal, and it worked well until the soviets built up their own arsenal. The aims were to keep the soviets from expanding, and the actions matched that aim (and succeeded.)

The Reagan years upset the Balance of Power, the policies of Détente and Deterrence. He made the MX missile a stationary weapon, changing it from a second strike weapon in Mutual Assured Destruction to a destabilizing first strike weapon. He tried to develop the Star Wars missile defense system, which sought absolute security from nuclear attack (though it was very faulty.) The development of tactical nukes didn’t do much to help the stability of the situation either. These actions undermined all previous forms of Containment, Détente and Deterrence., but they succeeded. Through these destabilizing displays of power Reagan was able to bring the USSR to the negotiating table, and eventually the downfall of the Soviet Union.

At the beginning of the unipolar era, the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration were also successful. Both practiced an ideology referred to as pragmatic realism. They both had strict rules for engagement and would only get involved in a situation if they had multilateral support. Clinton added to it, and used force only if it was in US interest, if there was an exit strategy, and if he had multi-lateral support. Both used a good mix of soft-power and hard-power and handled the new difficulties that arose in the new unipolar system. With the US being the sole world power, it had to be more mindful of its actions in order to keep the rest of the world on its side.

Insolvent Policies

When power and principle are in balance, and the aims of the nation match the actions it takes policies are solvent. Likewise, when power and principle are unbalanced the policies are insolvent. The twentieth century saw its fair share of these as well.

President Wilson, the President most commonly associated with the Universalist movement, tended to lean to far to the idealist side and causing an imbalance in the system. He also had a bad tendency to contradict his own ideologies in his actions. In 1916, when he sent marines into Veracruz for Mexican oil he violated his own democratic peace theory; he invaded democratic Mexico. In 1919 there was another incident where he went against he belief in national self-determination. Instead of letting the Chinese have back their sovereignty and land that the Japanese ceized during World War I, Wilson instead went along with the secret pact Japan had signed with Britain allowing them to keep the land they captured in turn for Japan joining the League of Nations. The conquered Chinese lands were not given the option of national self-determination.

Wilson was too ideologically driven near the end of World War I. Britain and France wanted an armistice, but Wilson wanted unconditional surrender from the enemy. This went along with the popular notion that America was a crusader state that fights absolute wars. It also contradicted the Balance of Power theory. Wilson was too ideologically driven.

The Kennedy Administration took a far more realist approach than Wilson, but probably too realist of an approach. Kissinger and Kennedy had developed the Flexible Response approach to crisis situations, giving more options than Truman’s nuclear option. The problem was that the enemy would often adapt along with the incremental system, adjusting to each advancing level as time progressed. Flexible Response was partly responsible for pulling us deeper and deeper into Vietnam. It was too realist of an approach, and therefore insolvent.

Carter was more akin to Wilson, he was too ideologically driven but more so for humanitarian reasons than Wilson. His focus on ideology was not backed up successfully by power, and therefore his handling of crisis situations left much to be desired. Carter’s polices were unbalanced, and therefore insolvent.

Conclusion

Like Magstadt says, American foreign policy works best with there is a balance between power and principle. That balance can be achieved through the mixing of Realist and Universalist principles, and using the appropriate actions to achieve your desired aims and the nation’s national interests. It is when that balance is not met that policies are insolvent and ineffective.

Times have changed since the cold war. No longer is the United States in a bi-polar world system. Now America is the sole world power, and must face new challenges in it’s struggle to remain on the world’s good side and not a tyrant. Along with the balance between power, principle, realism and idealism the US must also carefully decide between the use of soft-power and hard-power in crisis situations. If America is too maintain a positive image to the rest of the world, it must choose its actions, aims and interests very carefully.