Local preparedness for terrorist attacks: How America’s local law enforcement agencies are responding to the threat

Introduction

Terrorism has become a priority topic in law enforcement. Our nation has waged wars, detained prisoners, created a new government department and stepped up national defense measures in order to better combat the threat of terrorism and prevent another attack on our soil. Our first line of defense against attack on our soil does not lie with the CIA, FBI or the United States military; it lies with our local law enforcement agencies. Local police will be the first on the scene in a response and in the best position to stop an attack before it happens. A good national security strategy would provide support for these local enforcement agencies as they endeavor to keep their communities safe. Using data from a US Department of Justice Study in 2004, this paper will analyze where local law enforcement agencies have made improvements, where they have remained stagnant and where they have backtracked as we face this new threat to our safety.

Emergency management is the process of preparing for and attempting to prevent, a man-made or natural disaster. There are four stages in emergency management: (1) preparation, (2) mitigation, (3) response and (4) recovery (Waugh, 1990, p. 4). This analysis will focus on the first two stages and how local law enforcement agencies have addressed them post 9/11. Preparedness involves identifying available resources for a response, developing inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional response plans, training responders and testing response plans. Mitigation involves identifying hazards and assessing their levels of risk, designing programs to reduce those risks and taking steps to reduce loss of property and life.

Terrorism, though not to be underestimated, is more predictable than a natural disaster. Terrorists aim to make a political statement through violence in the public view. They need visibility to be successful, and often choose symbolic targets. Their motivations drive them to be more likely to attack population centers, critical infrastructure, or targets of religious, political or symbolic importance. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda operatives targeted the World Trade Center, a symbol of American economic power, and the Pentagon, a symbol of American military power. Natural disasters could care less what they destroy. Terrorism is a goal-directed behavior and is intended to have a psychological impact beyond its immediate victims. Their ultimate aim is not to only harm their victims, but to influence a target audience. If you know a terrorist’s goals and who they are trying to influence, you have a good chance of predicting their targets and can take meaningful steps to prepare for and mitigate an emergency.

In the book Protecting the American Homeland, the authors use a four tier framework in their approach to national security and mitigating and responding to a terrorist-related disaster. The four tiers are (1) perimeter security at the borders, (2) preventative activities, (3) protection of domestic sites and (4) consequence management after an attack (O'Hanlon et. al., p. 3). Within this framework the authors recommend expanding domestic law enforcement agencies, modernizing and linking local databases with one another, improving security at critical infrastructure (i.e. nuclear power plants, toxic chemical plants and biological research facilities), background checks on drivers carrying hazardous chemicals with other safety measures, and taking other numerous protective measures to ensure the safety of public and private infrastructure. They want to improve airport security, make improvements to border security and better equip local responders for mass casualties following an attack. Improving emergency preparedness efforts in these areas will be the best way to mitigate potential devastating terrorist attacks.

Literature Review

In preparation for this paper I read Terrorism and Emergency Management by William L. Waugh, Jr.; Protecting the American Homeland by Michael E. O'Hanlon, Peter R. Orzag, Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan and James B. Steinberg; and “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11” an article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman. I found these works to be very helpful in providing the background and framework necessary to study this subject and analyze the findings of the data I selected.

Terrorism and Emergency Management by William Waugh takes a more textbook like approach to the subject than the other two works I studied. Waugh takes a step-by-step approach and explains the details and theories behind the different approaches to mitigating and minimizing a terrorist disaster. Waugh identifies four steps in emergency management: (1) preparation, (2) mitigation, (3) response and (4) recovery (1990, p. 4). Through the book he details each step and elaborates on what kinds of preparations go into each. Waugh helps one understand the litany of preparation it takes to prepare for a possible attack, and the obstacles that prevent one from being effective. For example, Waugh points out that emergency management is a “low salience issue until a disaster occurs (Waugh, 1990, p.18).” Preparing for a terrorist attack was not on the minds of Americans until after 9/11/2001. Had it been the impact would have been less severe. He also notes how the “technical complexity” of preparedness functions makes them difficult to “sell” to the electorate so that funding can be allocated (Waugh, 1990, p. 18). People seem to not to be able to see the value in being prepared until after they need it.

Waugh goes over the six principle models of terrorism: (1) the revolution or national liberation model; (2) the civil disorder model; (3) the law enforcement model; (4) the international conflict or surrogate warfare model; (5) the human rights or repressive violence model; and (6) the vigilante model. If you know your terrorist's motives and goals, then you can narrow down what targets and actions he or she is likely to pursue in their attack. Knowing what model of terrorism one is facing can help one tremendously in their preparations.

Protecting the American Homeland was published by the Brookings Institution and written by a multidisciplinary team of scholars. In the book, the authors studied the nation’s current emergency preparedness and response systems and made recommendations as to how to make improvements. They made their analysis on a four-tier framework: (1) perimeter security at the borders, (2) preventative activities, (3) protection of domestic sites and (4) consequence management after an attack (O'Hanlon et. al., p. 3). They recommend addressing perimeter defense at four levels; air, sea, road/rail and people by stepping up airport and port security, improving ballistic missile defense systems, increasing Coast Guard numbers and updating equipment to improve coast protection, monitoring incoming cargo on our road and rail border crossings, and improving our visa and passport systems. They want to link together the myriad of criminal databases across the nation to tighten the net around suspects, improve security around critical infrastructure like nuclear power plants, toxic chemical plants and biological research facilities, and run background checks on drivers carrying hazardous materials on our highways. The solutions proposed in this booked helped me identify what variables to address in this study to evaluate the response of local law enforcement agencies to the 9/11 events.

Hoffman, in his article, noted the changing nature of terrorism. “The enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide attacks on September 11,” he said, “eclipsed anything previously seen in terrorism (Hoffman, 2002, p. 303).” Osama bin Laden had accomplished the biggest and most influential terrorist attack in modern history. He remarked on the rare “patience and detailed planning” that went into the attacks, as well as the “determination [of the hijackers] to kill themselves as well as their victims (p. 304).” According to Hoffman, the US misjudged terrorists, having been “lulled into believing that mass, simultaneous attacks... were likely beyond the capabilities of most terrorists (p. 305).” The attention of US officials, he argued was too one-sided; often focusing exclusively on low-end threats like car bombs or high-ends ones like chemical or dirty bomb attacks; rarely anywhere in between (p.306). Regardless of which, September 11 made clear that the US needed to change is assumptions about terrorists and their capabilities, and make adjustments to national defense measures accordingly. Hoffman offers a deep look into Al Qaeda, its structures and motives that is integral in addressing and understanding the threat they pose.

Methods and Data

The data for this analysis was taken from a 2004 survey from the National Institute of Justice, a branch of the Department of Justice. The study focused on state and local governments and their roles following the events of 2001. For the purposes of this analysis, I focused only on the local law enforcement agencies, as they will more than likely be the first responders to an event.

The investigators used a sampling frame of 400 police and sheriff’s agencies. 200 were from the nation’s largest departments while the other 200 were selected randomly from the National Public Safety Information Bureau’s directory of law enforcement administrators. The District of Colombia, due to its unique governmental structure, was omitted from the study. 58.5% of the largest 200 departments responded and so did 35% of the second subset. The final number of respondents in my analysis is tallied at 186. Several privacy measures were taken in the coding of this survey for public use. Any identifying information for the respondents was removed, and the open ended responses were masked.

Using the framework from Protecting the American Homeland, I selected the following variables to analyze in my assessment of local law enforcement improvements from 2001 to 2004: airport security, border security, commercial vehicle enforcement, security for critical infrastructure, security for special events/dignitaries and intelligence sharing. In the survey, respondents were asked about changes in the allocation of resources to the different variables since September 11, 2001. They made their selections along a Likert scale including the responses “much fewer resources”, “fewer resources”, “no change”, “more resources”, “much more resources” and “N/A for our agency.” Responses with “N/A for our agency” were removed from the data sets before analysis.

Results

Airport security chart

Because airplanes were the primary weapons in the September 11^th attacks, and because the airline industry is a key mass transit system in the United States, airports have become one of the front lines for preventing a terrorist threat. In Protecting the American Homeland, airport security is addressed as part of securing the nation’s borders and keeping terrorists from entering our country. Roughly 68% of the respondents reported that more resources have been allocated to their agency for airport security. 13.8% reported “much more”, while 54% reported only “more”. 28.7% reported “no change” in resources while the remaining 3.4% reported that “fewer resources” had been allocated to this critical area of national defense. 87 respondents replied to this question.

Border security Chart

Border security is in the first tier of addressing national security. A secure border is integral to keeping unwanted elements out of our society and keeping them from doing harm to our people. Only 42 of 186 agencies responded to this variable, but not every local agency is located on the border to provide direct border security. Of those that did respond, roughly 23.8% reported increases in allocations to border security; 16.7% of that being “more” and 7.1% being “much more.” 71.4% cited “no change” in resources and 4.8% reported declines; 2.4% for both “fewer” and “much fewer.”

Commercial vehicle enforcement chart

Commercial vehicles transport hazardous chemicals and other dangerous materials across the country along our roads and interstates. Drivers have access to potentially dangerous materials, and often drive through heavily populated areas to get to their destinations. Proper enforcement and policing of commercial vehicles is a key component in protecting our nation’s population and mitigating the threat of an attack. 72.9% responded that there has been “no change” in the amount of resources allocated to this arena of emergency preparedness and response. 25% reported increases; 20.8% being “more” and 4.2% being “much more”. 2.1% reported decreases; 1.4% being “fewer” and 0.7% “much fewer.” 144 respondents answered this variable.

Security for critical infrastructure chart

Critical infrastructure includes power plants, mass transit systems, waterlines, and other integral systems to the operation of our society. These are prime targets for terrorists because they would have a dramatic impact on the populace and would disrupt their lives significantly. According to this data 63.8% of agencies have seen increases in resource allocation for the security of critical infrastructure; 42.5% being “more” and 21.3% “much more.” 33.3% reported no change and 2.9% reported decreases; 2.3% reported “fewer” and 0.6% “much fewer.” 174 of the 186 respondents responded to this question.

Security for special events and dignitaries

Buildings are not the only symbolic targets available to terrorists; leaders, celebrities, and political office holders can be symbolic targets of high value. Even special events and ceremonies can be of high symbolic importance to a culture or community. As such, denying a terrorist the opportunity of these targets should be a priority. In accordance, 61.4% of local agencies have reported increases in the allocation of resources to the security of dignitaries and special events; 42.7% being only “more” and 18.7% being “much more.” 33.9% reported “no change.” 3.5% reported “fewer resources” and 1.2% reported “much fewer resources.” 171 respondents answered this question.

Intelligence gathering analysis and sharing chart

The sharing of intelligence databases between agencies was cited as a major strategy for improving internal preventative measures in the mitigation of terrorist threats by the authors of Protecting the American Homeland. The data here suggests that 67.3% of responding local agencies have seen increases in this area; 44.3% seeing “more resources” and 23% seeing “much more.” 30.5% reported “no change”, 1.7% “fewer” and 0.6% “much fewer resources.” 174 respondents responded to this question.

Implications

In four of the five variables analyzed, fifty percent or more of respondents identified that either “more resources” or “much more resources” have been allocated to them. Overall then, improvements have been made to national defense from 2001 to 2003. Though progress has been made, has enough progress occurred in each variable?

Airport security has made vast improvements, though 28.7% are still reporting “no change” in resources and 3.4% are reported “fewer resources” being allocated to this critical area. In national defense, as in chains, the system is only as strong as its weakest link. Because the network of flights is so interconnected, and a passenger only has to go through security at the airport they fly out of, security needs to be uniform across the board. If all attention is focused at high population airports like JFK in New York but not at JAX in Jacksonville, FL; what is preventing a suspect from passing the lax security in Jacksonville and picking up a connecting flight at JFK, where he or she carries out an attack? To prevent instances such as these, security should be uniformly tight across the nation.

It is troubling that the numbers for border security are so low, as it is possible for an operative to bypass airport screening and security by hopping the border undetected. More protection is needed to better detect and mitigate possible threats. More support should be allocated by federal agencies like Border Control, Customs and the US Coast Guard to assist local law enforcement agencies in their efforts to keep terrorists from entering our country undetected. These measures are suggested as part of the first tier in Protecting the American Homeland.

Commercial vehicle enforcement is an often over-looked liability to public safety. Everyday thousands of drivers haul volatile, toxic and otherwise dangerous materials on our nation’s highways and through our population centers. Even more are transported across the nation’s vast railroad network. As a preventative internal measure against attack, the US should crack down on commercial vehicle enforcement and ensure that the drivers are not of questionable or suspicious background and that the movements of all hazardous materials are accounted for and well documented. With 72.9% reporting “no change” in resources in this area it is clear that local law enforcement agencies are not focusing on this critical area of need.

Securing critical infrastructure like our power plants, water sanitation plants and transportation systems should be a priority. Attacks on these systems that are as heavily relied upon as these would have devastating physical and emotional effects on the population. Luckily, 63.8% of responding local agencies have reported increases in resources to securing these sites. The remaining 36.2% needs to catch-up and close these gaps in their security.

A lot of progress has been made in securing special events and protecting visiting dignitaries. 61.4% of respondents have increased the allocation of resources to this area. Assassinations have a big impact on a society, especially those of important figures like presidents and other leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. But dignitaries don’t typically visit every local entity, so this may be a reason why 33.9% reported “no change” in resources, and why 4.7% reported declines.

A key preventative measure in mitigating acts of terrorism would be the linking of databases and the sharing of intelligence amongst the nation’s various law enforcement agencies. The 67.3% of agencies that reported increases in resources to intelligence gathering, analysis and sharing suggests that this is happening, but not completely across the board. 30.5% are reporting “no change” and 2.3% have reported decreases. Holes like these could allow suspects to “hide-out” in areas where intelligence sharing is lax and allow them to operate “under the radar.” Again, this measure should be uniform across the nation to ensure the best possible security for the people.

Conclusion

While many improvements have been made, there is a lot of room for improvement in securing our nation. A national defense system is only as strong as it weakest part and, as such, any measure taken should be uniform across the board. A centralized approach would work best in enforcing this uniformity, and that would include heavy action from the federal government and its law enforcement agencies. This study was published in 2003, studying only the immediate reactions of local agencies to the September 11, 2001 events. There have been many changes in our national security strategy since then. Airport security has increased significantly, the Department of Homeland Security grew in numbers and funding and the Federal government took the lead on many fronts. Still, cooperation between federal, state and local agencies should be focused on if the most efficient and successful results are desired. Local agencies have the best quality knowledge of their localities and know how best to protect them. They will also be the first on the scene in the event of an attack. These local agencies should be given whatever resources are necessary to ensure the protection of this nation, its infrastructure and citizens. To do anything less would be foolish and negligent.

Bibliography

Hoffman, B. (2002). Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism. Studies in conflict & terrorism, 25: 5, 303-316.

Foster, C., & Cordner, G. (2004). Impact of terrorism on state and local law enforcement agencies and criminal justice systems in the United States. United States Department of Justice. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR 4677.

O'Hanlon, M. E., Orzag, P. R., Daadler, I. H., Destler, I. H., Gunter, D. L., Litan, R. E., et al. (2002). Protecting the American homeland: A preliminary analysis. Washington, D.C.: R.R. Donnelley.

Waugh, J. W. (1990). Terrorism and emergency management: Policy administration. ,New York: M. Dekker.

Charts

Airport security
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Fewer resources	3	1.6	3.4	3.4
	No change	25	13.4	28.7	32.2
	More resources	47	25.3	54.0	86.2
	Much more resources	12	6.5	13.8	100.0
	Total	87	46.8	100.0
Missing	System	99	53.2
Total		186	100.0

Border security
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much fewer resources	1	.5	2.4	2.4
	Fewer resources	1	.5	2.4	4.8
	No change	30	16.1	71.4	76.2
	More resources	7	3.8	16.7	92.9
	Much more resources	3	1.6	7.1	100.0
	Total	42	22.6	100.0
Missing	System	144	77.4
Total		186	100.0

Commercial vehicle enforcement
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much fewer resources	1	.5	.7	.7
	Fewer resources	2	1.1	1.4	2.1
	No change	105	56.5	72.9	75.0
	More resources	30	16.1	20.8	95.8
	Much more resources	6	3.2	4.2	100.0
	Total	144	77.4	100.0
Missing	System	42	22.6
Total		186	100.0

Security for critical infrastructure
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much fewer resources	1	.5	.6	.6
	Fewer resources	4	2.2	2.3	2.9
	No change	58	31.2	33.3	36.2
	More resources	74	39.8	42.5	78.7
	Much more resources	37	19.9	21.3	100.0
	Total	174	93.5	100.0
Missing	System	12	6.5
Total		186	100.0

Special events and dignitaries
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much fewer resources	2	1.1	1.2	1.2
	Fewer resources	6	3.2	3.5	4.7
	No change	58	31.2	33.9	38.6
	More resources	73	39.2	42.7	81.3
	Much more resources	32	17.2	18.7	100.0
	Total	171	91.9	100.0
Missing	System	15	8.1
Total		186	100.0

Intelligence gathering analysis and sharing
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Much fewer resources	1	.5	.6	.6
	Fewer resources	3	1.6	1.7	2.3
	No change	53	28.5	30.5	32.8
	More resources	77	41.4	44.3	77.0
	Much more resources	40	21.5	23.0	100.0
	Total	174	93.5	100.0
Missing	System	12	6.5
Total		186	100.0